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Abstract
The academic world is wonderful. Like few other professionals, we can choose
what we want to do and what questions we think are important, which in our
line of work means choosing what topics we want to research. But what in-
uences our choices? This paper examines what drives scholars to select Law
and Economics (L&E) as a topic for research. It does so by implementing the
methodology of many L&E papers { by assuming that regulation and incentives
matter.
Legal scholars face very dierent academic incentives in dierent parts of the
world. In some countries, the academic standards for appointment, promotion
and tenure encourage legal scholars to concentrate on L&E. In others, they
strongly discourage such research. Thus, we should expect wide variation in the
rate of participation of legal scholars in the L&E discourse across countries. On
the other hand, economists are evaluated with similar yardsticks everywhere.
Thus, participation of economists in the L&E discourse is likely to vary much
less from one place to another.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the academic incentives are a major factor
in the level of participation in the L&E scholarship. This \incentives hypothe-
sis" is presented and then examined empirically on data gathered from the list
of authors in L&E journals and the list of participants in L&E conferences. The
data generally supports the hypothesis. In the legal academia, the incentives
to focus research on L&E topics are the strongest in Israel, they are weaker in
North America and weakest in Europe. In fact, the data reveal that lawyers'
authorship of L&E papers weighted by population is almost ten times higher in
Israel than in North America; while in Europe it is almost ten times lower than in
North America. By comparison, the weighted participation level of economists
{ who face relatively similar academic environments across countries { in L&E
research is not signicantly dierent across countries.45788-TEXT.NATIVE.1149946270 6/10/2006 6:35 AM 
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF "LAW & ECONOMICS" 
Oren Gazal-Ayal*
ABSTRACT 
The academic world is wonderful. Like few other professionals, we 
can choose what we want to do and what questions we think are 
important, which in our line of work means choosing what topics we 
want to research. But what influences our choices? This paper examines 
what drives scholars to select Law and Economics (L&E) as a topic for 
research. It does so by implementing the methodology of many L&E 
papers – by assuming that regulation and incentives matter.  
Legal scholars face very different academic incentives in different 
parts of the world. In some countries, the academic standards for 
appointment, promotion and tenure encourage legal scholars to 
concentrate on L&E. In others, they strongly discourage such research. 
Thus, we should expect wide variation in the rate of participation of 
legal scholars in the L&E discourse across countries. On the other hand, 
economists are evaluated with similar yardsticks everywhere. Thus, 
participation of economists in the L&E discourse is likely to vary much 
less from one place to another.  
The hypothesis of this paper is that the academic incentives are a 
major factor in the level of participation in the L&E scholarship. This 
"incentives hypothesis" is presented and then examined empirically on 
data gathered from the list of authors in L&E journals and the list of 
participants in L&E conferences. The data generally supports the 
hypothesis. In the legal academia, the incentives to focus research on 
L&E topics are the strongest in Israel, they are weaker in North 
America and weakest in Europe. In fact, the data reveal that lawyers' 
authorship of L&E papers weighted by population is almost ten times 
higher in Israel than in North America; while in Europe it is almost ten 
times lower than in North America. By comparison, the weighted 
participation level of economists – who face relatively similar academic 
environments across countries – in L&E research is not significantly 
different across countries.  
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. This paper greatly benefited from 
comments of Jochen Bigus, Phil Curry, Gerrit DeGeest Henrik Lando, Francesco Parisi and JJ 
Prescott. I want to thank everyone who helped me gather the information about academic 
incentives in different countries including Anne van Aaken, Ronnie Eklund, Nuno Garoupa, 
Gerrit DeGeest and Henrik Lando. Michael Taksyak, Yonatan Kehat and Nardeen Sbait supplied 
excellent research assistance.  
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In the last half a century, Law and Economics (L&E) has become 
one of the most influential movements in legal academia. Many law 
scholars and economists direct much of their time and energy to this 
field. But what drives them (or should I say, us) to L&E? If we want to 
pat ourselves on the back, we would probably point to the virtues of the 
methodology and our interest in promoting knowledge for the benefit of 
all. But if we want to be more consistent with our methodological 
approach, we must also look for other, more direct and self-serving 
explanations. If consumers and suppliers, tortfeasors and contracting 
parties are assumed to maximize their wealth and self-interest, why 
aren't we? 
The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent academic 
incentives drive scholars to L&E. Before explaining the method, let me 
assuage some of the possible objections, emotional or rational, to such a 
project. For purposes of this paper, I am both the scientist and one of the 
laboratory mice. It would probably be hard for a laboratory mouse to 
convince its colleagues that he knows what drives them to turn the 
running wheels. It is especially hard here. Any attempt to use economics 
to show that L&E scholars are not driven solely by the search for truth, 
might be resisted by both supporters of the methodology, who might 
dislike the conclusion, and opponents who are unconvinced (and 
perhaps unwilling to be convinced) by the method. Hence, I should 
explain my aim upfront. By examining the effects of incentives on L&E 
scholarship I do not mean to say anything about the content of L&E 
research, or the validity of its approach to the study of law. After all, the 
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bread of the baker may be excellent, even if he is partly (or even solely) 
interested in maximizing profits.
1 My point is not normative, but 
descriptive. I will try to explain why some scholars choose to engage in 
the L&E discourse and others do not, but by doing so, I say nothing 
about the importance or validity of their work.   
My hypothesis is that participation in L&E weighted by population 
is greater where the academic incentives to be a L&E scholar are 
higher.
2 Therefore, I examine the academic incentives to write L&E 
papers, especially with regards to academic appointment and promotion 
procedures. I show that for economists, wherever they are, the academic 
incentives drive them to similar tracks.  Research in L&E is equally 
valuable to the academic career of economists on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In contrast, law scholars are evaluated differently in different 
places. In some places, like Israel, being a L&E scholar is very 
beneficial. In others, like most of Europe, it is hardly a plus. Hence, one 
would guess that, if incentives matter to legal scholars, authorship of 
L&E papers is likely high in Israel, low in Europe and somewhere in the 
middle in the United States and Canada. On the other hand, one would 
predict that participation of economists in such projects is 
approximately the same everywhere.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Part I 
compares the academic incentives to publish L&E papers, for 
economists and legal scholars in Europe, North America and Israel. Part 
II analyses data gathered from the lists of authors from L&E journals 
and examines whether it supports the incentives assumption. A few 
comments about the future of research in L&E are presented in the 
concluding part of the paper.  
 
I. WHAT COUNTS FOR ACADEMIC SCHOLARS?
What affects academic researchers' prestige and promotion?   
Almost all around the world academicians are rewarded for publication. 
The publish-or-perish mantra has become a household motto for faculty 
members, at least at the early stages of their career.
3 Mostly unofficial 
 
1 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 15 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., London, Clarendon Press 1869)  
2 Weighting the number of participants in L&E per the number of scholars in Law 
or in Economics generally could have been a more accurate indicator to the effects 
of academic environment, yet it is difficult to define who is a legal scholar and to 
gather national data about the number of legal scholars. The differences in the rate 
of participation per population are probably a good proxy. See also note 26 infra.
3 According to Wikipedia "'Publish or perish' refers to the pressure to constantly 
publish work in order to further or sustain one's career in academia. The 
competition for tenure-track faculty positions in academia puts increasing pressure 
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and often ambiguous standards guide scholars to the most rewarding 
venues for publications. These standards are thus one of the most 
important factors for academic success. Though other factors can also 
be categorized as academic incentives, it seems that publication is the 
most important verifiable factor and hence it can serve as a good 
starting point.
4
Economists are usually evaluated according to the same standards 
everywhere. Economists on both sides of the Atlantic are most rewarded 
 
on scholars to frequently publish new work." See Wikipedia,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish_or_perish
4 Other factors might also play a role in inducing a certain type of research. Money 
is clearly one such factor. The Olin foundation gave about $370 million to different 
projects over the years, and a large part of the money went to support L&E 
scholars or projects. For the importance of Olin to the development of L&E see 
Henry G. Manne, How law and economics was marketed in a hostile world: a very 
personal history, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS, Francesco Parisi, Charles K. Rowley, eds., pp. 309-327, 2005 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=745944, at 322-323. Some argue that 
money cannot buy success for an academic discipline because scholars are fiercely 
independent and universities are sensitive to charges that their research was 
“purchased” in exchange for external funding. See Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. 
Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the 
United States at http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/pdf/garoupa_2005/Legal_Innovation.pdf.
The careful reader might have noticed by now that I do not subscribe to this view. 
Monetary inducements work on academicians in the exact same way they work on 
other people. Obviously in most cases they would not convert a devoted opponent 
of the methodology to a supporter. But when a young scholar has to choose 
between few potential tracks that interest her, it is hard to believe that monetary 
incentives, that can also help her to advance her research, would have no effect on 
her decision. Still, I do not think the Olin Foundation has substantially altered the 
demography of the L&E scholars. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 130, 272-84 
(arguing that the Olin Foundation played a pivotal causal role in the success of the 
L&E movement). People that applied to Olin grants and those who joined Olin 
centers were probably those who believed they could benefit from being L&E 
scholars. Thus, many Israelis received grants from Olin or worked for centers 
supported by the Olin foundation while only few European did the same. Olin 
might have enlarged the pie of L&E, but did not substantially change its 
distribution. Another factor that is sometimes mentioned as a reason for the 
attraction of L&E is role models. In the United States, Judge Richard Posner is 
usually the example. In Israel, Lucian Bebchuk might be the one. Seven of the 
Israeli papers in the sample below were authored by students of Lucian Bebchuk. 
See Lucian Bebchuk website at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/CV_January%202006.pdf. Yet, 
again, students follow Bebchuk or Posner at least partly because they know it can 
help their future academic career. Hence I believe role models play a limited role 
in the distribution of L&E scholarship.  
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for publishing in core economic journals like Econometrica and the 
American Economic Review. L&E journals are also equally rated in 
most places, with the Journal of Law and Economics usually at the top 
of the list.
5 If the incentives hypothesis it true, then the similarity of the 
evaluation standards is likely to result in a similar rate of participation 
of economists in the L&E discourse.  
Lawyers, on the other hand, face different evaluation standards in 
different places. In Europe, legal scholars are usually not required to 
publish in foreign languages at all.
6 Law is perceived as mainly a local 
field of research. For appointment, promotion and tenure decisions, 
publications in L&E journals are of limited importance and are not more 
valuable than a legal paper in the local language about the local law.
7 In 
fact, they are often of much less value. For example, for an Austrian or 
German candidate for a position in the academia, the need to find a 
chair in a university requires covering the topics of a relevant field 
doctrinally. There is no chair in L&E.
8 True, there are exceptions.  In 
some countries in Europe, like Belgium, the starting point was, until 
lately, that every publication is equally valuable, with no advantage for 
publication in international journals. But since most lawyers would find 
it easier to publish about their own legal system in their native language, 
writing a L&E paper, even in such places is usually not a time-effective 
way to promote their career. The Netherlands is the only exception to 
the rule, where a few positions are reserved for L&E professors, and for 
them L&E publications are required. Still, the remaining legal scholars 
in the Netherlands are not required to write papers in non-Dutch 
 
5 The Journal of Law and Economics is considered a good second tier venue and, 
in some impact factor rankings, the Journal of Law Economics and Organization is 
also ranked in the list of the top 50. See Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Theofanis P. 
Mamuneas & Thanasis Stengos, Rankings of Academic Journals and Institutions in 
Economics, 1 Journal of the European Economic Association, 1346, 1349.  See 
also Pedro C. Vieira, Top ranking economics journals impact variability and a 
ranking update to the year 2002, at 
http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/04.06.21_WP149_Pedro%20C.
%20Vieira.pdf
6 There are few exceptions. In the field of international law, scholarly writing in 
English and American journals is sometimes necessary for a scholar in this field. In 
some countries, like Denmark, there are few academic incentives to publish in 
English lately, but these publications do not have to be in a reviewed journal and 
can equally be a chapter about Danish law in a book. Therefore, even in these 
cases, there are no incentives for law scholars to divert resources for the study of 
L&E or other non-local legal fields.  
7 Most of the information about the standards for academic success come from 
interviews with European scholars and email exchanges.   
8 The only exception is the Chair held today by Hans-Bernd Schäfer, an economist, 
at the University of Hamburg. 
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journals at all. Therefore, for a European legal scholar it is usually not 
recommended to divert recourses to L&E study.
9
In Israel, on the other hand, academic nomination, promotion and 
tenure decisions are made by interdisciplinary committees, not by 
lawyers. For them a paper in Hebrew is considered much less important 
than a paper in a prestigious foreign journal. Since the committee is not 
comprised only of lawyers, the publications are not required to be in 
legal journals. An economic journal is equally valuable and a L&E 
journal is even more so. True, Israeli legal scholars can still write 
doctrinal legal papers for American or other non-Israeli law journals, 
but if they want the paper admitted to a highly ranked law journal it 
better be about the legal system of the reviewers. Here, obviously, 
Israeli scholars face relative disadvantage. At least initially they know 
less about the details of the local legal system and culture. On the other 
hand, in L&E, they need to know much less about the local law and 
hence can compete on more equal terms. Consequently, there is a strong 
incentive to concentrate on L&E, even for scholars who do not define 
themselves L&E scholars.  
American lawyers are not required to publish papers about foreign 
law. Yet, the federal system encourages papers that can be relevant to 
different legal systems within the federation, and L&E often analyze 
general doctrines that are not specific to one legal system. In addition, 
the heritage of legal realism encourages interdisciplinary legal 
research.
10 Hence, the highly rated law reviews are very amenable to 
L&E papers, much more than they are to local doctrinal papers. Still, for 
an American legal scholar, L&E competes with other avenues for legal 
research which are equally beneficial for academic promotion, including 
constitutional law and legal analysis of general American legal 
doctrines and practices. Thus, if academic incentives are the most 
substantial factor, the rate of participation of lawyers in the L&E 
discourse is likely to be the highest in Israel, lower in the United States 
and the lowest in Europe.  
 
II.     WHERE DO LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARS COME FROM?
A. Method 
In this section I examine the background of authors of L&E papers. 
Data were gathered from the table of content of L&E journals and list of 
 
9 See also Gerrit De Geest Law and Economics in Belgium, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000) 
10 See Garoupa & Ulen, supra note 4.  
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participants in L&E conferences during the years 2004 and 2005. The 
list of L&E journals was taken from Wikipedia and includes nine 
journals from Europe and the United States.
11 Since I am concentrating 
on North America and Europe, the conferences examined were of the 
European and American L&E associations. Each person who 
participated in writing a paper that appeared in a conference or a journal 
was counted. Those participating in writing more than one paper were 
counted several times accordingly. The bibliographic data about each 
participant were gathered from the internet and, when the data on the 
web was lacking, through questions directed to the scholars.  
Relying on L&E journals and conferences in estimating the rate of 
participation in the L&E discourse may generate a number of 
objections. It can be argued that lawyers use economic arguments 
without being part of the international L&E movement. For example, 
Schäfer argues that although L&E is not openly used in the German 
legal academia, German legal scholars use economic arguments de-
facto often.
12 Yet, when I refer to L&E I define it narrowly. I do not 
mean to refer to any legal paper using consequential arguments or to the 
economic effect of legal rules. For my purpose here, "Law and 




15 and Richard Posner.
16 At the 
risk of being inaccurate I would say that what characterizes this field is 
usually the conscious use of economic models and methodology in legal 
reasoning. For that purpose, the L&E journals and conferences are good 
representatives of the scholarship in the field.  
Participants were divided to groups, according to their nationality 
 
11 The journals are American Law and Economics Review, Erasmus Law and 
Economics Review, the European Journal of Law and Economics, the International 
Review of Law and Economics, the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
the Journal of Law and Economics, the Journal of Legal Studies, the Journal of 
Law Economics and Policy and the Review of Law and Economics.  
12 See Hans-Bernd Schäfer, What are the Practical Implications of Law and 
Economics Research in Germany? (Manuscript) (pointing out that lately corporate 
law scholars are referring to policy and economic consequences of legal rules in 
their writing) 
13 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
14 See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 
15 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, (1972)   
16 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, (1
st edition, 1970) 
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(U.S.A., Canada, Europe
17, and Israel) and discipline (Lawyers and 
Economists). Since many participants move to the United States, 
temporarily or permanently, the nationality was not defined according 
to the current affiliation of the scholar, but according to the country in 
which the scholar gained his or her first academic degree.  
 
B. The Data 
The following table (which appears in more details in the 
appendix) presents the demography of the authors in L&E journals in 
2004 and 2005, both in real numbers and weighted by population: 
 
Number of Participants  Per 10,000,000 people 
Population  Law Econ. L&E Neither Law Econ. L&E  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  31 164 40 15 1.04 5.48 1.34 0.50
32,251,238 Canada 2 17 3 1 0.62 5.27 0.93 0.31
7,109,929 Israel  5 10 9 0 7.03 14.06 12.66 0.00
400,369,441 Europe* 16 143 21 5 0.40 3.57 0.52 0.12
Other  3 31 3 1
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
In this table, authors were categorized according to their formal 
education. Authors with formal degrees in both law and economics were 
counted in the L&E column
18 and those with no degree in law or 
economics appear in the "neither" column. Importantly, the number of 
economists authoring L&E articles is higher than the number of lawyers 
everywhere. Yet, in Israel it is only two times higher than the number of 
lawyers, in the United States it is four times higher and in Europe it is 
8.5 times higher. While the rate of participation of lawyers in the L&E 
discourse is extremely different from one place to another, the number 
of economists participating in L&E writing is relatively well correlated 
to the population. In the United States, Canada and Europe, there are 
between 3.5 to 5.5 authors per ten million people. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, the data reveal a high rate of Israeli economists per 
population in the sample, three times higher than the rate the United 
States or Canada.  
 
17 Europe, for the purpose of this paper, includes the member states of the EU 
before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland and Norway.   
18 Economists who work in law schools were also counted as L&E scholars.  
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The analysis above disregards the participants who have both legal 
and economics education. In Israel, Canada and Europe, people with 
both legal and economic formal background outnumbered the lawyers 
with no economic background. Hence, I allocated the participants in this 
group by what seems to be their major subject, either law or economics. 
Most importantly, authors with formal education in both fields who 
work in law schools were counted as lawyers while those working in 
departments of economics, as economists.
19 
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law Econ Neither Law  Econ  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  59 176 15 1.97 5.88 0.50
32,251,238 Canada 5 17 1 1.55 5.27 0.31
7,109,929 Israel  14 10 0 19.69 14.06 0.00
400,369,441 Europe* 27 153 5 0.67 3.82 0.12
Other  4 33 1
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
After this categorization, the picture changes slightly. Still, more 
economists than lawyers participate in most places. The only exception 
is Israel, were lawyer participation is higher. But the big picture does 
not vary substantially. In Europe, the number of economists authoring a 
L&E paper is six times higher than the number of lawyers, in Canada 
and the United States it is only three times higher and in Israel 
economists are outnumbered by lawyers. And again, the rate of 
participation of economists is relatively similar in Europe, the United 
States and Canada, between 3.8 and 5.8 participants per 10 million 
people, with the only exception being Israel where the rate is three times 
that number.  
When categorizing the same participants according to their current 
affiliation (instead of the country of first degree) a few changes can be 
observed. First, the share of the United States increases, and the others 
decreases, because many non-American scholars are often studying or 
working in the United States. More interestingly, the number of the 
 
19 In the previous table, people were classified to the L&E column in one of the 
following cases (the current classification is in brackets): 1. Economists who work 
mainly in law schools (economists); 2. Economists who work as economists but 
have a legal degree in addition to their degree in economics (Economists); 3.  
People with a post graduate degree in law and undergraduate degree in economics 
(Lawyers); 4. People with degrees in both fields who work in law schools or legal 
institution (Lawyers).   
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Dutch lawyers increases (from three to eight).
20 This increase can be 
explained by the rapid increase in the number of positions for L&E 
scholars in Dutch law schools in the last couple of years, positions that 
were filled by lawyers from other European countries.
21 
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law Econ Neither Law  Econ  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  69 202 16 2.31 6.75 0.53
32,251,238 Canada 2 13 0 0.62 4.03 0.00
7,109,929 Israel  7 9 1 9.85 12.66 1.41
400,369,441 Europe* 23 146 5 0.57 3.65 0.12
Other  0 16 0
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
An examination of participants in L&E conferences reveals 
somewhat different distribution. The following table is based on data 
from the American Law and Economics Association (ALEA) 
conference of 2005 and the European Association of Law and 
Economics (EALE) conference of 2005. Nationality was determined by 
the country of the first academic degree. Accordingly, there were 230 
participants in both conferences with the following background: 
 
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law Econ Neither Law  Econ Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  63 32 5 2.11 1.07 0.17
32,251,238 Canada 5 6 0 1.55 1.86 0.00
7,109,929 Israel  21 0 0 29.54 0.00 0.00
400,369,441 Europe* 11 60 3 0.27 1.50 0.07
Other  3 19 2
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
Few things can be observed immediately. First, the conferences are 
 
20 This can be observed in the detailed table in the appendix. 
21 The non Dutch legal Authors who are currently affiliated to Dutch institutions 
are Christoph Van der Elst (Belgium), Gerrit DeGeest (Belgium), Alessandra 
Arcuri (Italy), Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Italy, 3 papers) and Michael Faure. Two 
other Belgian legal scholars that were not on the list of authors during these two 
years are still clearly L&E scholars and are currently affiliated to Dutch law 
schools (Roger van den Bergh and Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe). 
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more balanced with almost an equal number of lawyers and economists 
(while the articles are written more by economists), mainly as a result of 
the dominancy of lawyers in ALEA.
22 The rate of participation of 
economists in the conferences is still very similar in Europe, Canada 
and the United states with Israel being the exception, this time with no 
economists at all (although seven of the lawyers have a formal 
postgraduate degree in economics). Again, per population, the 
participation of lawyers from Europe is by far the smallest; it is about 5 
to 7 times lower than in the United States and Canada. The rate of 
participation of Israeli lawyers is more than 100 times higher than of 
European lawyers and more than 10 times higher than of American 
lawyers. 
 
III.     DISCUSSION 
A. Lawyers who Choose Law and Economics 
 
The above analysis is consistent with the claim that participation in 
the L&E discourse is highly correlated with academic incentives 
favoring that discipline. European lawyers usually do not need to write 
articles in English and for them papers in L&E do not carry substantial 
academic benefit in appointments and promotion decisions. To the 
contrary: in many cases such a paper would be much less valuable to 
their career than a doctrinal paper in their own language.  Publishing an 
article about the local law in a local journal may be easier as well. These 
are strong disincentives to overcome language and disciplinary barriers.  
For Americans and Canadians, interdisciplinary papers are as 
valuable as legal papers for academic career advancement. There are no 
language barriers, since the L&E journals are in English. The most 
prestigious journals are also looking for articles with a national or 
international interest and L&E papers, like other theoretical or critical 
legal papers, are often general enough for that purpose. Thus, L&E is 
another potential course a scholar can take; not necessarily more or less 
valuable than concentrating on any other legal subject or type of legal 
discourse. Thus, North Americans are much more likely than European 
lawyers to author and publish L&E papers.
23 
22 84 of the participants in the ALEA were lawyers, and 68 were Economists. In 
the EALE, 19 were lawyers and 49 economists.  
23 Per population, American lawyers appear more than Canadian lawyers in L&E 
conferences and journals. This is not true for economists. This might be, at least 
partly, because language issues and academic standards in Quebec are more similar 
to those in Europe. In fact, there were two economists but no lawyers from Quebec 
in the samples of journals and conferences. An examination of Canadian L&E 
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For Israeli lawyers, there are several academic incentives that 
generate a preference for L&E. The requirement to publish in English, 
preferably in the United States, makes L&E one attractive research 
outlet. Another factor is that legal scholars in Israel do not necessarily 
need to publish legal papers, and are definitely not required to publish 
papers about Israeli law. In addition, Israelis suffer from a comparative 
disadvantage in writing doctrinal papers about American law, because 
they are usually less familiar with the nuances of the American legal 
system, and may have less credibility with American JD students, who 
make the bulk of acceptance decisions for prestigious American law 
reviews. This comparative disadvantage drives them to write papers that 
demand less acquaintance with the local rulings and legal developments 
and are peer reviewed. Hence, L&E is an excellent potential path for 
academic promotion. To the best of my knowledge, Israel is the only 
western country that requires legal scholars to publish in foreign law 
journals articles about foreign law for academic appointments and 
promotion, and this requirement may well explain the unique interest 
Israeli scholars have in such an interdisciplinary field.
24 
B. Economists who Choose Law and Economics 
 
As for economists, the rate of their participation in L&E does not 
substantially differ in the different places. This is precisely what the 
 
association members list gives a similar indication. Sixteen percent of the 
economists in the list (19 of 118) are from Quebec while only 10% of the lawyers 
are from that province (5 of 50) (These data excluded members with no indicated 
affiliation to a Canadian academic institution in the list) 
http://www.canlecon.org/CLEA%20members_09mar05.xls). Still, one cannot 
exclude the possibility that the difference between Canada and the United States is 
a mere coincidence because the number of Canadians in the sample is too small.  
24 Other interdisciplinary fields, like law and society or legal history, may also be 
appealing for Israeli lawyers, but often not to the extent seen with L&E, because 
excelling in these fields requires better language skills and familiarity with local 
culture. An examination of Israelis participation in authorship of international law 
articles and articles in law and society show that Israelis are much less dominant in 
these fields. Israelis were only 2.5% of the authors in journals of law and Society, 
1.5% in International Law Journals and 0.5% of the authors in journals of legal 
history based on data from 2004. In L&E Israelis were 4.6% of the authors (24 out 
of 520). A similar difference can be found when comparing percentage of Israelis 
in conferences of law and society (2.6%), legal history (0.5%) or comparative law 
(0.9%) with the percentage of Israelis in L&E conferences (9.7%). See Oren 
Gazal-Ayal, Comments on the State of Law and Economics in Israel, BAR ILAN 
LAW REVIEW (forthcoming, Hebrew). 
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incentives hypothesis predicts because the criteria for evaluating an 
economic publication are quite similar everywhere. The only surprise 
the data supply is the rate of participation of Israeli economists. It is 
higher than expected in authorship of articles and lower than expected 
in participation in L&E conferences. This might be a coincidence; the 
overall number of Israeli economists is relatively small.
25 Subject to this 
reservation, however, the results are consistent with the hypothesis.  
C.     Additional Comments 
 
One might argue that the reliance on population as a proxy for the 
number of scholars is flawed. It might be that Israel has more law 
scholars per population than the United States or Canada, and that there 
are more American law scholars, per population, than European. Yet, it 
is highly unlikely that the weighted number of Israeli law scholars is 
about 70 to 100 times higher than in Europe, or about 10 times more 
than in the US. In fact, an attempt to quantify the number of law 
scholars in the United States, Israel and two major European countries, 
Germany and France, seems to indicate that the number of European 
law scholars is at least as high, maybe even higher, than in North 
America or Israel.
26 
25 Only 10 economists participated in writing L&E articles.  This rate is high given 
the size of Israel, but it is still too small to draw any conclusions. On the lawyer 
side, the number of participants in both writing articles and presenting in 
conferences is 28, which is less likely to be a result of coincidence. Moreover, to 
strengthen the statistical validity I also examined the number of participants in the 
EALE and ALEA conferences of 2004. The result is consistent with the 
conclusions (15 Israeli lawyers of the 185 participants). 
26 Based on the directory of the Association of American Law Schools, there are 
8461 law school faculty in the United States (not including visiting professors, 
faculty who are not professors, lecturers and instructors). See Association of 
American Law Schools, STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL FACULTY AND 
CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY POSITIONS TABLES 2004 - 2005 at 
http://www.aals.org/statistics/0405/html/0405_T1A_tit4.html. In France there are 
7600 law professors (2426 full professors, and 5174 Associate Professors (Maîtres 
de conferences)). See 
ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/dpd/rers2005/chap9_13.pdf. In Germany, 
there are only 1,262 tenured or tenure track law faculty (922 professors and 360 
assistant professors (doizenten)) . See 
http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/biwiku/hochtxt.php. In Israel the number is 
approximately 250 (based on a count of the faculty in the web pages of the law 
schools in Israel, including all tenure and tenure track lecturers, full or part time). 
Per ten million people, there are approximately 250 American law professors, 350 
Israeli law professors, 150 German law professors and about 1250 France law 
professors. The difference between the weighted number of law professors in 
Israel, the United States and Germany is not big enough to explain why the per 
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The incentives hypothesis does not tell the whole story. For 
example it does not explain why different legal systems adopt different 
standards of evaluation. Garoupa and Ulen, argue that L&E is more 
popular in the American legal academia than in the European one 
because of the remarkable competitiveness of the North American 
higher education and the history of legal realism which created the 
necessary cultural basis for absorbing L&E.
27 I do not necessarily agree 
with their analysis. I believe it fails to explain why L&E was absorbed 
in Israel, where the academia is highly regulated and universities cannot 
compete over salaries or tuition fees. I also believe that their hypothesis 
cannot account for why L&E was well absorbed in departments of 
economics in Europe, which are subject to the same types of regulation 
as European law schools. Still, my hypothesis does not contradict 
Garoupa and Ulen’s claim, because I do not try to explain why the 
academic incentives are so different in Europe, Israel and North 
America. One might argue that this difference is the result of the 
competition, culture, or some other factors, and still accept that 
whatever causes such differences may affect participation in the L&E 
scholarship only indirectly, through the academic incentives.
28 
Another interesting fact the data reveal is the higher participation 
of lawyers in the conferences, as compared to the authorship in the 
journals. One possible explanation for this fact is that most L&E 
journals are economic oriented. They are peer reviewed journals 
containing short papers usually with a formal model, a type of writing 
more familiar to economists. Lawyers often write L&E papers in regular 
law journals, where the methodological requirements are less 
 
population rate of participation of law scholars in Israel is 10 times higher than in 
the United States and almost 100 times higher than in Germany. See tables 2, 3 and 
4 in the appendix. Since the weighted number of law professors in France is so 
much higher than in the United States and Israel, the absence of French lawyers 
from L&E is even more puzzling than the per population data show. Thus, a 
possible difference in the number of law scholars does not seem to explain the 
results. It is equally unlikely that the differences between Israel, Europe and North 
America can be explained by the average number of papers a law scholar writes in 
each place.  
27 See Garoupa & Ulen, supra note 10. 
28 One might argue that European law school lean more to the left, politically, then 
American law schools. According to this argument, L&E is stigmatized in Europe 
as a right-winged theory, and therefore is rejected by law schools. Yet, to the 
extent that this political factor is influential, it is again likely to impact indirectly 
through the academic incentives. Otherwise, one cannot explain why there are so 
many papers written by law school professors from the Netherlands, which is not 
so different politically from the rest of Europe, or why Israeli law scholars write so 
many L&E papers.  
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demanding. Economists, on the other hand, generally receive 
considerably less credit for law review publications. Yet, law review 
papers could not be counted here because it is impossible to strictly 
define a L&E legal paper. The number of publications in L&E journals 
is therefore only an imperfect proxy to the number of L&E papers. 
Economists are certainly over represented in this sample. Thus the 
conferences might tell a more accurate story about proportion of 
lawyers and economists in the L&E discourse.  
One last comment about the different countries in Europe: 
aggregating data about Europe is always tricky since the cultural 
differences within Europe are bigger than within United States. 
However, examining each country is also problematic because the 
number of samples is too small to have any statistical validity. In any 
case, the examination of the data from each country indicates that the 
similarities are sufficient for aggregation. In almost every country, the 
number of economists authoring an article was at least three times 
higher than the number of lawyers.
29 Only one European country, Italy, 
had more than 4 lawyers authoring a L&E paper, a number still 
substantially lower than the number of American or Canadian, when 
weighted by population.
30 
Still, one European country, the Netherlands, justifies special 
attention.
31 As I mentioned before, several Dutch universities offer 
position for L&E scholars. As a result, members of Dutch law schools 
(not necessarily Dutch in nationality) often write L&E papers. Yet, like 
in the rest of Europe, most legal scholars are not encouraged to write for 
American or international journals. Hence these few L&E scholars often 
write for international L&E journals while other Dutch law professor 
almost never do. In comparison, in Israel and to some extent in North 
 
29 The exceptions were Greece (4 lawyers and 7 economists), Italy (6 lawyers and 
14 economists), and Belgium (4 lawyers and 6 economists).  
30 Seven papers were written by Italian Scholars. Three of them were written by the 
same scholar, a lawyer with a Ph.D. in economics who works in a law and 
economics center in the Netherlands. Two other where written by graduates of the 
European Master Programme in Law and Economics, who are not on an academic 
track. Only one of them was authored by an Italian law scholar that works as a law 
professor in Italy.  
31 For participation of Dutch lawyers in the L&E research see tables in the 
appendix. Several Dutch universities have chairs for L&E, and thus appointment 
and promotion for these few scholars are affected by L&E publications. (I thank 
Gerrit DeGeest for this information). See Rudi W. Holzhauer & Rob Teijl Law and 
Economics in Austria, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert and Gerrit DeGeest , eds., 2000) (arguing that "budget cuts during 
recent years put pressure on economics departments in law faculties to focus more 
on ‘the law’ and hence law and economics became an interesting issue for these 
departments".)   
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America, many law professors that are not L&E scholars and that 
usually write regular legal papers for law reviews do from time to time 
write a L&E paper. Hence the relatively high rate of participation of 
Dutch scholars tells a different story than the American and Israeli one.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The different approach to L&E in Europe and North America has 
concerned many who described the development of the field.
32 Various 
explanations have been given to this difference.
33 A believer of 
economic analysis must also consider the economic explanation. 
Markets develop differently because of different regulation. So does the 
academic market for research. The regulation of academic 
appointments, promotion and tenure shape the incentives to participate 
in the L&E discourse. This simple economic insight is consistent with 
the data presented in this paper.  
To the extent that academic incentives are a major cause for the 
difference in lawyers' participation in L&E research, the consequence of 
this analysis is substantial. If that is the case, the research in L&E can 
be put down or boosted up by an alteration of academic requirement. If, 
for example, European countries would start requiring legal scholars to 
publish in foreign law journals, and will reward publications in highly 
rated English journals, the legal academic in Europe may find much 
more interest in L&E. Changes in this direction are taking place in some 
European countries. In Flanders, a productivity measurement system is 
being developed (commission Verbeke), that will reward scholars who 
publish in international journals. A similar development is taking place 
in Italian academia. In Denmark, the ministry of science is beginning to 
reward publications in English. These developments might not be 
 
32 See Henry G. Manne, How law and economics was marketed in a hostile world: 
a very personal history, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS, Francesco Parisi, Charles K. Rowley, eds., pp. 309-327, 2005 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=745944, at 316-317 ("The 
entrepreneurial efforts in Europe were greater on the economics side than on the 
law side; though I do not understand why this should have been so.") 
33 See for example, Wolfgang Weigel, Law and Economics in Austria, THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De 
Geest, eds., 2000) (arguing that economists were more willing to accept law and 
economics because they are more used to the methodology); Gerrit De Geest, 
supra note 9 (arguing that in continental Europe, legal science is generally seen as 
an autonomous science); Garoupa & Ulen, supra note 4 (arguing that the 
competitive nature of American Law Schools and the tradition of legal realism are 
the causes for the difference); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and 
Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INT. REV. L. ECON. 3, (giving few reasons for 
the success of L&E in the United States) 
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sufficient to make a substantial change, because currently an English 
chapter in a book about the local Danish or Belgian law is equally 
rewarded and there is still no pressure on legal scholars in Belgium and 
Denmark to compete in the top reviewed journals. Yet these 
developments in the academic standards for promotion might be the 
first steps that would lead to an increase in European lawyers' 
participation in L&E. After all, even academicians are to some extent, 
self interest human beings. 
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Participation in authorship of L&E Articles  
(According to nationality of authors and educational background)  
 
Number of Participants  Per 10,000,000 people 
Population  Law Econ. L&E Neither Law Econ. L&E  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  31 164 40 15 1.04 5.48 1.34 0.50
32,251,238 Canada  2 17 3 1 0.62 5.27 0.93 0.31
7,109,929 Israel  5 10 9 0 7.03 14.06 12.66 0.00
400,369,441 Europe*  16 143 21 5 0.40 3.57 0.52 0.12
8,188,806 Austria  0 1 3 0 0.00 1.22 3.66 0.00
10,481,831 Belgium  2 5 4 0 1.91 4.77 3.82 0.00
5,425,373 Denmark  0 11 0 0 0.00 20.28 0.00 0.00
5,260,970 Finland  0 3 0 0 0.00 5.70 0.00 0.00
61,004,840 France  0 19 0 0 0.00 3.11 0.00 0.00
82,515,988 Germany  1 31 4 3 0.12 3.76 0.48 0.36
11,275,420 Greece  4 7 0 0 3.55 6.21 0.00 0.00
4,065,631 Ireland  0 1 0 0 0.00 2.46 0.00 0.00
59,115,261 Italy  3 12 5 1 0.51 2.03 0.85 0.17
4,632,911 Norway  0 2 0 0 0.00 4.32 0.00 0.00
10,501,051 Portugal  0 7 0 0 0.00 6.67 0.00 0.00
44,351,186 Spain  0 7 4 0 0.00 1.58 0.90 0.00
9,076,757 Sweden  0 3 0 0 0.00 3.31 0.00 0.00
7,488,533 Switzerland  0 6 0 0 0.00 8.01 0.00 0.00
16,386,216 Netherlands  2 12 1 0 1.22 7.32 0.61 0.00
60,139,274 U.K  4 16 0 1 0.67 2.66 0.00 0.17
20,750,052 Australia  1 5 1 0 0.48 2.41 0.48 0.00
128,389,000 Japan  0 1 0 0 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
10,060,684 Hungary  0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1,339,157 Estonia  0 1 0 0 0.00 7.47 0.00 0.00
50,633,265 Korea  1 2 0 0 0.20 0.39 0.00 0.00
105,149,952 Mexico  0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4,195,729 New-Zealand 0 2 0 0 0.00 4.77 0.00 0.00
143,682,757 Russia  0 4 0 0 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
22,896,488 Taiwan  0 3 1 0 0.00 1.31 0.44 0.00
184,284,898 Brazil  0 1 0 0 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
1,112,225,812 India  0 6 2 0 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00
37,912,201 Argentina  0 1 0 0 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00
27,392,442 Malaysia  1 0 0 0 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
74,709,412 Turkey  0 5 0 0 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00
1,306,724,067 China  1 5 0 1 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
7,054,867 Hong Kong  0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30,182,038 Morocco  0 1 0 0 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
Others  3 31 3 1
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
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Table 2
Participation in authorship of L&E Articles  
(According to Nationality of authors and their dominant discipline)  
 
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law Econ Neither Law  Econ  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  59 176 15 1.97 5.88 0.50
32,251,238 Canada  5 17 1 1.55 5.27 0.31
7,109,929 Israel  14 10 0 19.69 14.06 0.00
400,369,441 Europe*  27 153 5 0.67 3.82 0.12
8,188,806  Austria  0 4 0 0.00 0.00  4.88 
10,481,831  Belgium  5 6 0 0.00 4.77  5.72 
5,425,373  Denmark  0 11 0  0.00  0.00  20.28 
5,260,970  Finland  0 3 0 0.00 0.00  5.70 
61,004,840  France  0 19 0  0.00  0.00  3.11 
82,515,988  Germany  2 34 3  0.36  0.24  4.12 
11,275,420  Greece  4 7 0 0.00 3.55  6.21 
4,065,631  Ireland  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  2.46 
59,115,261  Italy  7 13 1  0.17  1.18  2.20 
4,632,911  Norway  0 2 0 0.00 0.00  4.32 
10,501,051  Portugal  0 7 0 0.00 0.00  6.67 
44,351,186  Spain  2 9 0 0.00 0.45  2.03 
9,076,757  Sweden  0 3 0 0.00 0.00  3.31 
7,488,533  Switzerland  0 6 0 0.00 0.00  8.01 
16,386,216  Netherlands  3 12 0  0.00  1.83  7.32 
60,139,274  U.K  4 16 1  0.17  0.67  2.66 
20,750,052  Australia  1 6 0 0.00 0.48  2.89 
128,389,000  Japan  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  0.08 
10,060,684  Hungary  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
1,339,157  Estonia  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  7.47 
50,633,265  Korea  1 2 0 0.00 0.20  0.39 
105,149,952  Mexico  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4,195,729  New-Zealand  0 2 0 0.00 0.00  4.77 
143,682,757  Russia  0 4 0 0.00 0.00  0.28 
22,896,488  Taiwan  0 4 0 0.00 0.00  1.75 
184,284,898  Brazil  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  0.05 
1,112,225,812  India  1 7 0 0.00 0.01  0.06 
37,912,201  Argentina  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  0.26 
27,392,442  Malaysia  1 0 0 0.00 0.37  0.00 
74,709,412  Turkey  0 5 0 0.00 0.00  0.67 
1,306,724,067  China  1 5 1 0.01 0.01  0.04 
7,054,867  Hong Kong  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
30,182,038  Morocco  0 1 0 0.00 0.00  0.33 
Others  4 33 1
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
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Table 3
Participation in authorship of L&E Articles  
(According to countries of current institutional affiliation and dominant discipline)
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law  Econ Neither Law  Econ  Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  69 202 16 2.31 6.75 0.53
32,251,238 Canada  2 13 0 0.62 4.03 0.00
7,109,929 Israel  7 9 1 9.85 12.66 1.41
400,369,441 Europe*  23 146 5 0.57 3.65 0.12
8,188,806  Austria  0 5 0 0.00 6.11  0.00 
10,481,831  Belgium  3 6 0 2.86 5.72  0.00 
5,425,373  Denmark  0 11  0 0.00 20.28  0.00 
5,260,970  Finland  0 3 0 0.00 5.70  0.00 
61,004,840  France  0 21 0  0.00  3.44  0.00 
82,515,988  Germany  1 33 3  0.12  4.00  0.36 
11,275,420  Greece  2 5 0 1.77 4.43  0.00 
4,065,631  Ireland  0 1 0 0.00 2.46  0.00 
59,115,261  Italy  0 8 1 0.00 1.35  0.17 
4,632,911  Norway  0 3 0 0.00 6.48  0.00 
10,501,051  Portugal  0 6 0 0.00 5.71  0.00 
44,351,186  Spain  2 7 0 0.45 1.58  0.00 
9,076,757  Sweden  0 5 0 0.00 5.51  0.00 
7,488,533  Switzerland  0 5 0 0.00 6.68  0.00 
16,386,216  Netherlands  9 8 0 5.49 4.88  0.00 
60,139,274  U.K  6 19 1  1.00  3.16  0.17 
20,750,052  Australia  1 3 0 0.48 1.45  0.00 
128,389,000  Japan  0 1 0 0.00 0.08  0.00 
10,060,684  Hungary  0 1 0 0.00 0.99  0.00 
1,339,157  Estonia  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
50,633,265  Korea  0 3 0 0.00 0.59  0.00 
105,149,952  Mexico  0 2 0 0.00 0.19  0.00 
4,195,729  New-Zealand  0 1 0 0.00 2.38  0.00 
143,682,757  Russia  0 2 0 0.00 0.14  0.00 
22,896,488  Taiwan  0 4 0 0.00 1.75  0.00 
184,284,898  Brazil  0 1 0 0.00 0.05  0.00 
1,112,225,812  India  0 1 0 0.00 0.01  0.00 
37,912,201  Argentina  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
27,392,442  Malaysia  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
74,709,412  Turkey  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
1,306,724,067  China  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
7,054,867  Hong Kong  0 1 0 0.00 1.42  0.00 
30,182,038  Morocco  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Others  0 16 0
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
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Table 4
Participation in L&E Conferences 
(According to Nationality of authors and their dominant discipline)  
 
Number of Participants  Per 10M people 
Population  Law  Econ  Neither Law  Econ Neither
299,093,237 U.S.A  63 32 5 2.11 1.07 0.17
32,251,238 Canada  5 6 0 1.55 1.86 0.00
7,109,929 Israel  21 0 0 29.54 0.00 0.00
400,369,441 Europe*  11 60 3 0.27 1.50 0.07
8,188,806  Austria  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
10,481,831  Belgium  2 2 0 1.91 1.91  0.00 
5,425,373  Denmark  0 4 0 0.00 7.37  0.00 
5,260,970  Finland  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
61,004,840  France  0 6 1 0.00 0.98  0.16 
82,515,988  Germany  1 8 0 0.12 0.97  0.00 
11,275,420  Greece  1 0 0 0.89 0.00  0.00 
4,065,631  Ireland  0 0 0 0.00 0.00  0.00 
59,115,261  Italy  3 11 1  0.51  1.86  0.17 
4,632,911  Norway  0 1 0 0.00 2.16  0.00 
10,501,051  Portugal  0 2 0 0.00 1.90  0.00 
44,351,186  Spain  0 3 0 0.00 0.68  0.00 
9,076,757  Sweden  0 4 0 0.00 4.41  0.00 
7,488,533  Switzerland  0 2 1 0.00 2.67  1.34 
16,386,216  Netherlands  1 4 0 0.61 2.44  0.00 
60,139,274  U.K  3 11 0  0.50  1.83  0.00 
Others  3 19 2
* includes the member states of the EU before the 2004 enlargement plus Switzerland 
and Norway.
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